Tuesday, December 30, 2025

LAW IN FAILURE Connor v. Donaldson and the Catastrophic Breakdown of Mental-Health Law

American civil-commitment law has produced one of the largest preventable public-safety disasters in modern governance. The Supreme Court’s Connor v. Donaldson (1975) decision effectively made it nearly impossible to hold someone involuntarily until they had already demonstrated imminent danger. The real-world consequence: a steady stream of suicides, murders, rampage killings, family annihilations, and urban collapse that our legal system was structurally barred from preventing.

The Legal Misconstruction

Connor held that a state cannot involuntarily confine a non-dangerous person. Over time, this has calcified into a rigid judicial rule: no detainment without imminent risk. Lawyers call this liberty. Families call it too late.

Aggregate Costs of the “Too Late” Rule

Suicide in the U.S. (2023): over 49,300 deaths annually. National Institute of Mental Health
Firearms alone account for about 27,300 suicides of that total. CDC
For decades, the mental-health system has been the de facto suicide prevention system — and it fails because the standard for intervention is too high.

Homicide in the U.S. (2023): approximately 22,830 deaths. National Institute of Mental Health
A non-trivial subset of homicides involve perpetrators with untreated or poorly managed serious mental illness; research estimates range around ~10% in broad homicide contexts and much higher in personal-cause mass killings and spree murders. Treatment Advocacy Center -

Murder-Suicides: An estimated ~1,200 deaths per year in the U.S. occur in murder-suicide incidents — a pattern often tied to untreated mental crises. Violence Policy Center

Iconic Rampage and Mass Killings

Notable deadliest attacks often involved individuals whose psychosis went untreated or uncontained under current legal standards:

Virginia Tech shooting — 32 killed, perpetrator died by suicide. Wikipedia
Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting — 26 killed.
Aurora theater shooting, Tucson shooting, Parkland, and others each added dozens more — murders that might have been preventable with earlier, capacity-based intervention.

Each of these atrocities shares a lead-in period of documented deterioration, warning signs, or treatment refusal — exactly the scenarios where current laws say “you must wait.” Waiting means after bloodshed.

Systemic Social Harm

The consequences of too-late intervention ripple outward:

Homelessness: People with untreated psychosis appear disproportionately in unhoused populations. Cities with high concentrations of untreated severe mental illness have skyrocketing public costs.
Real-estate decline: Municipal assessors and urban economists consistently find double-digit (≈15%) property value declines in areas with concentrated street disorder and chronic homelessness — effects real enough for mortgage appraisals and investment decisions.
Quality of life collapse: Wealthy urban neighborhoods once insulated now report sustained erosion of livability metrics: public safety measures, commercial flight, escalating sanitation and emergency-service costs.

These outcomes are not collateral damage. They are direct downstream costs of a legal regime that delays help until after violence or complete functional deterioration.

The Core Pathology: Anosognosia

Many individuals with serious mental illness (SMI)—particularly schizophrenia-spectrum conditions—suffer from anosognosia: a loss of insight that makes them unable to recognize their own illness. It’s not denial. It’s a neurological incapacity.

Current law treats anosognosia as autonomy.

That is the structural flaw.

A Predictable Failure

Rampage killers, family annihilators, and murder-suicide perpetrators often exhibit:

escalating delusional fixation,
worsening reality testing,
treatment refusal,
social isolation,
mounting risk that goes unchecked until a violent act.

The law insists on imminent danger even when every clinical indicator points to inevitable catastrophe.

Public Safety vs. Legal Catch-22

The everyday application of Connor has produced this tragic paradox:

Too much liberty for the incapacitated.
Too little protection for victims, families, and communities.

Conclusion

Connor v. Donaldson was not a civil-rights triumph. It was a jurisprudential mistake with measurable social costs: tens of thousands of preventable suicides, thousands of murders, mass killings that scar entire generations, homelessness that reshapes urban geography, and real-estate markets that sag under disorder.

The legal refusal to intervene before the violence, anchored in a rigid imminent-danger standard and blindness to anosognosia, is a public safety failure with daily casualties.

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Rampage Killings, Mass Murders, and Family-Annihilation / Parricide Cases

with documented or strongly supported serious mental illness (SMI)

I. Rampage Killings / Mass Murders (Public Settings)

Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting — Newtown, CT (2012)

Perpetrator: Adam Lanza
SMI: Severe psychiatric pathology; profound withdrawal, paranoia; untreated
Deaths: 26

Virginia Tech shooting — Blacksburg, VA (2007)

Perpetrator: Seung-Hui Cho
SMI: Major depression with psychotic features; prior psychiatric intervention
Deaths: 32

University of Texas tower shooting — Austin, TX (1966)

Perpetrator: Charles Whitman
SMI: Severe emotional disturbance; amygdala-adjacent brain tumor
Deaths: 18

Aurora theater shooting — Aurora, CO (2012)

Perpetrator: James Holmes
SMI: Schizoaffective/schizophrenia-spectrum illness; florid psychosis
Deaths: 12

Tucson shooting — Tucson, AZ (2011)

Perpetrator: Jared Lee Loughner
SMI: Paranoid schizophrenia; found incompetent, later restored
Deaths: 6

Parkland high school shooting — Parkland, FL (2018)

Perpetrator: Nikolas Cruz
SMI: Severe developmental/psychiatric disorders; long system failures
Deaths: 17

Columbine High School massacre — Littleton, CO (1999)

Perpetrators: Eric Harris & Dylan Klebold
SMI: Mixed pathology (depression, suicidality; not classic psychosis)
Deaths: 13
Included for completeness

II. Family-Annihilation / Parricide (Private / Domestic Settings)

John List — NJ (1971)

Victims: Wife, mother, 3 children
SMI: Long-standing paranoid/religious delusions
Outcome: Life imprisonment

Andrea Yates — TX (2001)

Victims: Five children
SMI: Severe postpartum psychosis; command hallucinations
Outcome: NGRI; committed

Bradford Bishop — MD (1976)

Victims: Wife, 3 children, mother
SMI: Severe emotional disturbance; paranoid traits
Outcome: Fugitive

Robert William Fisher — AZ (2001)

Victims: Wife, 2 children
SMI: Paranoid/control delusions; personality pathology
Outcome: Fugitive

Mark Hacking — UT (2004)

Victims: Wife, mother-in-law
SMI: Psychotic depression; grandiose/paranoid delusions
Outcome: Guilty but mentally ill

Anthony Todt — FL (2019)

Victims: Wife, 3 children
SMI: Delusional beliefs (psychosis disputed at trial)
Outcome: Life imprisonment

Camden Burton Nicholson — CA (2019)

Victims: Parents; housekeeper
SMI: Claimed psychotic break; sanity phase litigated
Outcome: Convicted

Joel Guy Jr. — TN (2016)

Victims: Both parents
SMI: Severe psychopathology; extreme violence
Outcome: Life imprisonment

Geneviève Lhermitte — Belgium (2007)

Victims: Five children
SMI: Serious mental illness under psychiatric care
Outcome: Convicted; later euthanasia

Pierre Rivière — France (1835)

Victims: Mother, sister, brother
SMI: Classic psychotic parricide; foundational forensic case
Outcome: Committed

III. Attempted or Single-Target Political / Public Attacks (SMI)

John Hinckley Jr. — DC (1981)

SMI: Schizophrenia/erotomanic delusions
Outcome: NGRI; decades hospitalized

Key Clinical Pattern (Across Categories)

Untreated or undertreated psychosis
Anosognosia (lack of insight)
Repeated warning contacts with systems
Legal barriers to sustained care
Victims often dependents or symbolic targets

This list reflects system failure, not typical mental illness behavior.

Sunday, December 28, 2025

To: WHO ICD-11 Maintenance Platform

Dear ICD-11 Revision and Maintenance Committee Members,

I respectfully submit this proposal requesting the creation of a stand-alone ICD-11 diagnostic entity for Compulsive Buying–Shopping Disorder (CBSD).

Current ICD-11 status

In ICD-11, compulsive buying–shopping disorder appears only as an example/inclusion term under the residual category 6C7Y – Other specified impulse control disorders, rather than as a distinct diagnostic entity. This residual placement limits international surveillance, research comparability, and health-system planning.

Epidemiologic justification

Evidence demonstrates that CBSD is prevalent and persistent across cultures:

A meta-analysis of 40 studies (≈32,000 participants) reported a pooled prevalence of ~5% (Maraz et al., Addiction, 2016).
U.S. population prevalence is estimated at 5.8% (Koran et al., Am J Psychiatry, 2006).
Representative European samples show prevalence near 7% (Müller et al., J Behav Addict, 2010).

These rates justify recognition beyond a residual category.

Social and health-economic burden

CBSD produces measurable harms:

Objective association with real consumer debt (Achtziger et al., J Econ Psychol, 2015).
Demonstrated quality-of-life impairment, with income-equivalent monetary valuation of burden in a longitudinal community cohort (Zhang et al., Psychiatry Research, 2017).
Significant comorbidity with mood, anxiety, and substance-use disorders, implying increased health-service utilization (Black, World Psychiatry, 2007; Zhang et al., 2017).

Clinical validity

CBSD is characterized by:

persistent/recurrent buying or shopping behavior,
impaired control,
continuation despite negative consequences,
clinically significant distress or impairment,
exclusion when behavior occurs exclusively during manic or hypomanic episodes.

Randomized and controlled trials demonstrate benefit from disorder-specific psychotherapy, particularly CBT (Mitchell et al., 2006; Müller et al., 2008), supporting its validity as a distinct treatment target.

Proposed ICD-11 placement (two acceptable options)

Option A (conservative):
Create CBSD as a leaf entity within Impulse control disorders, replacing its current “example only” status under 6C7Y.

Option B (behavioral-addiction aligned):
Create CBSD as a leaf entity under Disorders due to addictive behaviours, consistent with an emerging scholarly position and its phenomenologic overlap with gambling and gaming disorders.

Expected impact

Establishing a stand-alone ICD-11 entity would:

improve international epidemiologic surveillance,
enhance research comparability,
reduce misuse of residual categories,
support health-economic analyses and treatment evaluation.

Thank you for your consideration of this proposal.

Respectfully submitted,

David Behar, MD
United States

Proposal to Establish a Distinct ICD-11 Diagnostic Code for Seminal Vesicle Secretory Failure (SVSF)

Submitted to:

National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS)
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

Related Classification Authority:
World Health Organization – ICD-11 Maintenance Platform

Proposed by:
David Behar, MD
(Physician; policy and classification proposal)

Date: 2025

I. Executive Summary

This proposal recommends creation of a distinct ICD-11 diagnostic entity for Seminal Vesicle Secretory Failure (SVSF)—a clinically meaningful, currently uncodable condition characterized by absent or markedly reduced seminal vesicle contribution to ejaculate volume, despite preserved ejaculation mechanics and patent outflow.

At present, ICD-11 forces clinicians to misclassify SVSF under:

Male sexual dysfunction,
Obstructive genital tract disorders,
Endocrine hypogonadism, or
Residual “other specified” categories.

This obscures epidemiology, impairs research on infertility and post-treatment sequelae, and undermines accurate clinical documentation.

II. Clinical Rationale

A. Medical Significance

Seminal vesicles contribute 60–70% of ejaculate volume and are essential for:

Sperm motility (fructose, prostaglandins),
Semen alkalinity and coagulation,
Fertility outcomes and assisted reproduction planning.

Loss of seminal vesicle secretory function is clinically distinct from:

Anejaculation (neurogenic or psychogenic),
Ejaculatory duct obstruction,
Testicular failure or hypogonadism.

B. Common Clinical Scenarios Currently Misclassified

Post-pelvic radiation or surgery (including prostate, bladder, colorectal)
Congenital seminal vesicle agenesis or hypoplasia
Post-infectious or inflammatory vesicle damage
Medication-induced secretory suppression
Autonomic denervation with preserved emission reflex

III. Current ICD-11 Gap

ICD-11 contains no organ-specific functional diagnosis for the seminal vesicles.

Existing codes are etiologically or anatomically incomplete, forcing inaccurate substitutions:

Clinical Reality	Current ICD-11 Outcome	Deficiency
Absent semen volume with intact ejaculation	Male sexual dysfunction	Mislabels reproductive pathology as sexual
Vesicle secretory failure without obstruction	Obstruction codes	Factually incorrect
Post-radiation loss of seminal fluid	Neoplasm aftercare codes	Non-specific, non-trackable
Congenital absence	Congenital genital anomalies	No functional classification

IV. Proposed ICD-11 Structure (Defensible & Minimal)

Primary New Code

GB0X.Y – Seminal vesicle secretory failure
(Chapter: Diseases of the genitourinary system → Diseases of male genital organs)

Definition:

Failure of the seminal vesicles to produce or contribute normal secretions to ejaculate volume, resulting in absent or markedly reduced semen volume, not attributable to ejaculatory obstruction or primary testicular failure.

V. Proposed Subcodes (Etiology-Specific, Non-Redundant)

GB0X.Y0 – Congenital seminal vesicle secretory failure

Agenesis or hypoplasia
Congenital developmental defects

GB0X.Y1 – Acquired seminal vesicle secretory failure

Post-infectious
Inflammatory
Idiopathic

GB0X.Y2 – Iatrogenic seminal vesicle secretory failure

Pelvic radiation
Pelvic surgery (prostate, bladder, rectal)
Androgen-deprivation sequelae

GB0X.Y3 – Neurogenic seminal vesicle secretory failure

Autonomic denervation
Spinal cord or pelvic nerve injury

GB0X.Y4 – Drug-induced seminal vesicle secretory failure

SSRIs
Antipsychotics
Alpha-adrenergic blockers
(with external cause coding retained)

VI. Coding Guidance (Preventing Misuse)

Explicit Exclusions

Ejaculatory duct obstruction → GB08
Primary testicular hypofunction → 5A80 / 5A81
Retrograde ejaculation → existing sexual dysfunction categories
Psychogenic anejaculation → HA60

Diagnostic Criteria (Minimum One Required)

Persistently low or absent ejaculate volume (<0.5 mL)
Imaging evidence of vesicle damage or absence
Biochemical semen analysis showing absent fructose
Clinical correlation with known vesicle-damaging exposure

VII. Public Health & Research Benefits

Accurate infertility epidemiology
Improved post-cancer survivorship tracking
Clearer differentiation between sexual dysfunction and reproductive organ failure
Better outcome studies in ART and fertility preservation
Reduced miscoding and payer disputes

VIII. Compatibility & Implementation

Backward-compatible with ICD-10-CM mapping (e.g., N53., N50. analogs)
No impact on existing codes
Minimal coder training burden
Aligns with WHO’s organ-specific functional taxonomy principles

IX. Requested Action

The CDC/NCHS is respectfully requested to:

Endorse this proposal for U.S. ICD-11-CM consideration
Submit the code family to the WHO ICD-11 Maintenance Platform
Permit interim national extension usage pending WHO ratification

X. Conclusion

Seminal Vesicle Secretory Failure is a real, common, and clinically distinct condition that currently lacks an appropriate diagnostic identity. Recognizing it corrects a structural omission in ICD-11 and advances accuracy in urology, oncology survivorship, reproductive medicine, and public health surveillance.

Proposal to Add a Distinct ICD-11 Diagnostic Code for Aviophobia (Fear of Flying)

Submitted to:

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(ICD-11 Coordination & Maintenance)

For consideration by:
World Health Organization
(ICD-11 Mortality and Morbidity Statistics)

1. Proposed Diagnostic Name

Aviophobia (Fear of Flying)

2. Proposed ICD-11 Placement

Parent category: HA60 – Specific phobia
Proposed subcode: HA60.A – Aviophobia (Fear of Flying)

3. Proposed Diagnostic Definition

Aviophobia is a specific phobia characterized by marked and persistent fear or anxiety triggered by air travel, including anticipation of flying, boarding aircraft, or being airborne. Exposure reliably provokes immediate fear or panic responses, leading to avoidance or endurance with intense distress. The fear is disproportionate to actual risk, persists for at least six months, and causes clinically significant distress or functional impairment.

Definition consistent with ICD-11 HA60 framework and DSM-5-TR specific phobia criteria.

References:

World Health Organization. ICD-11 Clinical Descriptions and Diagnostic Guidelines: Specific Phobia (HA60). WHO, 2019.
American Psychiatric Association. DSM-5-TR. APA Publishing, 2022.

4. Rationale for a Distinct Code (with Evidence)

A. High Prevalence and Public Health Significance

Fear of flying is among the most prevalent situational phobias in industrialized societies.

Population studies estimate 10–25% of adults report significant fear of flying.
2–5% meet criteria for a clinically impairing phobia.

References:

McIntosh, I. B., et al. “Fear of Flying: Clinical Characteristics and Treatment Outcomes.” Journal of Anxiety Disorders 23, no. 5 (2009): 627–632.
Oakes, M., & Bor, R. “The Psychology of Fear of Flying.” Aviation Psychology and Applied Human Factors 1, no. 2 (2011): 98–109.
Van Gerwen, L. J., et al. “Fear of Flying Treatment Programs.” Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 68, no. 6 (1997): 510–516.

B. Distinct Clinical and Psychopathological Profile

Aviophobia differs from other specific phobias in mechanism, phenomenology, and risk behaviors:

Combines loss of control, catastrophic risk misinterpretation, and enclosed-space exposure
Strong association with panic attacks rather than simple fear
High rates of anticipatory anxiety lasting days to weeks

References:

Bor, R. “Psychological Factors in Fear of Flying.” Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 78, no. 7 (2007): B20–B25.
Wilhelm, F. H., & Roth, W. T. “The Somatic Symptom Paradox in Panic Disorder.” Journal of Anxiety Disorders 15, no. 3 (2001): 253–268.

C. Medication Misuse and Patient Safety Concerns

Aviophobia is uniquely associated with situational benzodiazepine prescribing, alcohol self-medication, and unsafe sedation practices during flights.

Benzodiazepines are frequently prescribed off-label for flight anxiety despite lack of evidence for long-term benefit
Combined benzodiazepine–alcohol use during flights increases risk of respiratory depression and disinhibition

References:

Oakes, M., & Bor, R. “Benzodiazepines and Fear of Flying.” British Journal of General Practice 60, no. 572 (2010): 366–367.
Cloos, J.-M., & Ferreira, V. “Current Use of Benzodiazepines in Anxiety Disorders.” Current Opinion in Psychiatry 22, no. 1 (2009): 90–95.
Federal Aviation Administration. Medical Facts for Pilots. FAA, current edition.

D. Occupational, Disability, and Transportation Relevance

Fear of flying has direct occupational and economic consequences, disproportionately affecting:

Executives, clinicians, military personnel, pilots (non-operational), and emergency responders
Patients requiring air travel for specialized medical care
Individuals seeking disability accommodations or workplace modifications

Lack of a specific ICD code complicates documentation, accommodation, and outcomes tracking.

References:

Bor, R., et al. Clinical Psychology in Aviation. Wiley-Blackwell, 2002.
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). Mental Health in Aviation. EASA, 2019.

E. Research and Epidemiologic Limitations Under Current Coding

Without a discrete ICD-11 code:

Epidemiologic surveillance is impossible
Treatment outcomes (CBT, exposure therapy, VR-based treatment) cannot be reliably compared
Health-services utilization cannot be accurately tracked

Virtual-reality exposure therapy, now widely studied for aviophobia, cannot be reliably coded.

References:

Rothbaum, B. O., et al. “Virtual Reality Exposure Therapy for Fear of Flying.” American Journal of Psychiatry 157, no. 7 (2000): 1120–1122.
Carl, E., et al. “Virtual Reality Exposure Therapy for Anxiety Disorders.” Journal of Anxiety Disorders 61 (2019): 27–36.

5. Proposed Diagnostic Criteria (Summary)

A diagnosis of Aviophobia may be assigned when:

Flying or anticipation of flying reliably provokes intense fear or anxiety
Exposure results in panic symptoms or marked distress
Avoidance or endurance with distress is present
Symptoms persist ≥ 6 months
Clinically significant impairment in occupational, social, or medical functioning
Not better explained by PTSD or another mental disorder

References:

WHO ICD-11 HA60 guidelines
APA DSM-5-TR, Specific Phobia criteria

6. Coding Notes

May be coded with panic attacks
May be coded with anticipatory anxiety
May be coded with comorbid substance use related to situational coping

7. Benefits of Adoption

Improved diagnostic precision
Safer prescribing practices
Better occupational and disability documentation
Enhanced aviation-related mental health research
Reduced stigma through formal recognition

Supporting Frameworks:

WHO ICD-11 dimensional model
CDC public-health surveillance objectives

8. Conclusion

Aviophobia is a common, impairing, and clinically distinct condition with significant public health, safety, and economic implications. The absence of a specific ICD-11 code undermines patient care, research, and policy development. Creation of a discrete subcode under HA60 would materially improve diagnostic clarity while remaining fully consistent with ICD-11’s structure and intent.

The Law in Failure: The Eggshell Skull Doctrine in Torts and Constitutional Due Process

A White Paper on Tort Reform, Medical Causation, and the Fifth Amendment

Executive Summary

The eggshell skull doctrine—requiring tort defendants to “take the plaintiff as found” and bear full liability for unforeseeably severe injuries—has long been treated as a settled principle of American tort law. However, modern tort litigation, medical complexity, and constitutional jurisprudence expose a fundamental flaw in the doctrine: it permits arbitrary deprivations of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. By severing damages from foreseeability, proportionality, and reliable proof of medical causation, the doctrine transforms compensatory damages into a form of compelled insurance for plaintiffs’ preexisting defects. This white paper argues that constitutional due process requires reform or limitation of the doctrine.

I. Background: The Eggshell Skull Doctrine

The eggshell skull rule holds that once a defendant’s conduct is a cause-in-fact of injury, the defendant is liable for the full extent of harm, even if the plaintiff’s injuries are exacerbated by preexisting vulnerabilities. Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 461 (1965). Historically, the doctrine was justified as a corrective justice principle designed to ensure full compensation.

II. Due Process and Civil Liability

The Fifth Amendment prohibits deprivation of property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. Civil tort judgments are subject to this constraint. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 434 (1994). Due process requires:

A meaningful opportunity to be heard;
Rational, non-arbitrary standards; and
Proportionality between conduct and deprivation.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).

III. The Constitutional Defect: Loss of Foreseeability and Proportionality

Foreseeability is a cornerstone of tort law. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928). The eggshell skull doctrine abandons foreseeability at the damages stage, exposing defendants to catastrophic liability untethered from culpability. This creates outcomes that are unpredictable and disproportionate, violating due process principles articulated in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996).

IV. Forced Payment for Plaintiff Defects

The doctrine compels defendants to pay not merely for harm they caused, but for injuries magnified by the plaintiff’s age-related degeneration, genetic abnormalities, congenital illness, lifestyle choices, carelessness, fatigue, intoxication, or other preexisting impairments. These conditions—often inevitable or self-caused—are treated as legally indistinguishable from injuries actually caused by the defendant. This converts tort law into a system of involuntary loss-spreading, forcing private defendants to insure against another party’s biology and life history without fault or foreseeability.

V. Daubert, Medical Causation, and Evidentiary Failure

Under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), courts must exclude speculative or unreliable expert testimony. Medical causation requires reliable proof that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in producing the injury. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 742–43 (3d Cir. 1994).

The eggshell skull doctrine undermines Daubert by preemptively resolving causation questions as a matter of law, allowing experts to attribute the full scope of injury to defendants without reliably excluding alternative causes such as degeneration, intoxication, or behavioral risk factors. This evidentiary shortcut results in damages based on conjecture, violating due process. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324–25 (2006).

VI. Counterarguments and Rebuttals

A. “The Doctrine Is Settled Common Law”

Rebuttal: Longevity does not confer constitutional immunity. Courts have repeatedly reformed entrenched doctrines when they violate due process. Honda, 512 U.S. at 430–32; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

B. “It Affects Only Damages, Not Liability”

Rebuttal: Due process applies to damages as well as liability. Arbitrary or grossly disproportionate damages violate constitutional fairness. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574–75.

C. “Fairness Requires Full Compensation”

Rebuttal: Compensation cannot justify compelled subsidization. Forcing defendants to pay for harms caused by genetics, aging, intoxication, or carelessness exceeds compensation and becomes unconstitutional redistribution. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 528–29 (1998) (plurality).

D. “Daubert Solves the Problem”

Rebuttal: The doctrine structurally disables meaningful Daubert scrutiny by converting disputed medical causation into a legal presumption. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.

E. “Limiting the Doctrine Invades the Jury’s Role”

Rebuttal: Due process exists to constrain arbitrary jury outcomes. Courts routinely limit jury discretion through evidentiary and constitutional review. Honda, 512 U.S. at 432.

VII. Reform Proposals

Constitutional Limitation: Prohibit application of the eggshell skull doctrine where damages are unforeseeable and disproportionate.
Enhanced Causation Proof: Require Daubert-compliant medical evidence distinguishing defendant-caused harm from preexisting conditions.
Proportional Damages Instructions: Mandate jury instructions separating aggravation caused by defendants from independent vulnerabilities.
Judicial Review: Require heightened post-verdict review for damages driven by preexisting conditions.

VIII. Conclusion

The eggshell skull doctrine, as currently applied, denies defendants a fair hearing, forecloses meaningful evidentiary challenges, and imposes arbitrary deprivations of property. Constitutional tort reform is not an attack on compensation, but a restoration of due process. The Fifth Amendment requires that tort liability be grounded in foreseeability, proportionality, and reliable proof—not legal fictions that compel defendants to insure against the accidents of another’s biology and life history.

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I. Model Statutory Language

(Constitutional Limitation on the Eggshell Skull Doctrine)

Section 1. Short Title

This Act shall be known as the Fair Causation and Proportional Liability Act.

Section 2. Legislative Findings and Purpose

The Legislature finds that:

Civil tort judgments constitute deprivations of property subject to constitutional due process.
Liability for damages must be based on reliable proof of causation and proportional responsibility.
The traditional “eggshell skull” doctrine, when applied without limitation, may impose damages disproportionate to a defendant’s fault and unsupported by reliable medical evidence.
Advances in medical science permit meaningful differentiation between harm caused by a defendant and harm attributable to preexisting conditions, degeneration, genetics, intoxication, fatigue, or other independent factors.

Purpose.
The purpose of this Act is to preserve full compensation for injuries actually caused by defendants while ensuring that damages awards comply with due process by requiring reliable proof of medical causation and proportional allocation of damages.

Section 3. Limitation on Liability for Preexisting Conditions

(a) A defendant shall be liable only for the aggravation of a preexisting condition that is proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, to have been caused by the defendant’s conduct.

(b) A defendant shall not be liable for:

Injury or impairment that would have occurred in the absence of the defendant’s conduct; or
The natural progression of age-related degeneration, genetic vulnerability, congenital conditions, disease, intoxication, fatigue, carelessness, or other independent factors not caused by the defendant.

Section 4. Evidentiary Requirements for Medical Causation

(a) Medical causation of damages shall be established by expert testimony that meets the requirements of Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence and applicable reliability standards.

(b) Expert testimony must:

Identify the specific injury caused by the defendant;
Distinguish that injury from preexisting or independent conditions; and
Reliably explain the basis for attributing the claimed damages to the defendant rather than alternative causes.

Section 5. Proportional Damages

(a) Where injury results from a combination of defendant-caused harm and preexisting or independent conditions, damages shall be apportioned to reflect only the harm caused by the defendant.

(b) Failure to apportion damages where apportionment is reasonably possible shall constitute reversible error.

Section 6. Construction

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to:

Eliminate liability for injuries actually caused by defendants; or
Limit recovery where the defendant’s conduct is proven to be the predominant cause of the plaintiff’s injury.

II. Model Jury Instructions

(Fair Causation and Proportional Damages Instruction)

Instruction 1: Causation of Injury

You must determine whether the defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff’s injury.

The defendant is responsible only for injuries that were actually caused by the defendant’s conduct. The defendant is not responsible for injuries caused by:

Preexisting medical conditions,
Age-related changes,
Genetic factors,
Disease,
Intoxication,
Fatigue,
Carelessness, or
Other conditions or events not caused by the defendant.

Instruction 2: Aggravation of Preexisting Conditions

If you find that the plaintiff had a preexisting condition, you may award damages only for the extent to which the defendant’s conduct aggravated that condition.

You may not award damages for:

The condition itself, or
Any worsening that would have occurred even without the defendant’s conduct.

Instruction 3: Medical Expert Testimony

In determining causation and damages, you must rely on medical expert testimony that is supported by reliable methods and evidence.

You should not accept an expert’s opinion if it:

Assumes causation without explanation,
Fails to consider alternative causes, or
Attributes all injury to the defendant without distinguishing preexisting or independent conditions.

Instruction 4: Proportional Damages

If you find that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused partly by the defendant and partly by other factors, you must award damages only in proportion to the harm caused by the defendant.

Damages must reflect:

What injury the defendant caused, and
The extent of that injury, and no more.

Instruction 5: Fairness and Constitutional Limits

Your verdict must be based on evidence and reasoned judgment. You may not impose damages as a form of punishment or as compensation for conditions the defendant did not cause.

III. Optional Appellate Preservation Clause (Bench Instruction)

“Failure to require reliable proof distinguishing defendant-caused injury from preexisting or independent conditions may result in a verdict that violates constitutional due process.”

Saturday, December 13, 2025

The Law in Failure: Reputational Torts Sue the Wrong Defendant, Victims Continue to Pay the Price

The Law of Reputation Is a Fraud, and the Real Killers Walk Free

Let’s annihilate the polite illusions.
Let’s torch the cowardice.
Let’s say what no judge, no prosecutor, no law professor, and no moralizing Twitter mob has the courage to say:

Reputational harm is inflicted by people, not by words —
and the people who inflict it are walking away like innocent bystanders while their victims die.

Our legal system is a joke.
A sick joke.
A system designed to shield the social executioners — the employers, the mobs, the prosecutors, the sanctimonious hypocrites — while pretending that the person who spoke the lie is the “bad actor.”

This is fantasy law, written by cowards, enforced by cowards, and defended by people who cannot stomach the reality of human cruelty.

The Bodies Are on the Ground. The Mob Did It. The Law Protects Them.

Teenagers are killing themselves after sextortion.

Adults are killing themselves after harassment, deepfakes, and exposure.

Families are shattering.
Careers are burning.
Reputations are being ripped to shreds.

And everyone KNOWS what caused it:

The pile-on
The shaming
The snickering coworkers
The hysterical moralists
The fake-woke enforcers of digital purity
The gossiping neighbors
The bullying classmates
The institutional cowards
The prosecutors who think hormones are a crime

But when the legal system goes looking for a villain?
It points at the first person who spoke, not the thousands who applied the pressure that broke the victim’s spine.

That’s not justice.
That’s complicity.

A system that refuses to recognize the true causes of harm is a system drunk on its own delusion.

If a Nude Photo Kills Someone, It’s Because Society Loaded the Gun.

Let’s obliterate the biggest lie in the field:

A naked picture is not lethal.
A rumor is not lethal.
A lie is not lethal.
PEOPLE are lethal.
The reaction is lethal.

Without society’s cruelty, a nude photo is meaningless.
Without the mob, a rumor evaporates.
Without punitive institutions, a whisper dies instantly.

The law’s refusal to acknowledge this — its insistence that “the speaker” caused everything — is intellectual malpractice.

If a leaked nude kills someone, it is because society furnished the weapon, cocked the hammer, and aimed it at the victim’s skull.

And the law turns a blind eye.

Puritanical Prosecutors Are Not Protectors. They Are State-Sanctioned Reputation Assassins.

Let’s be blunt:
The prosecutors who charge teens for consensual sexting are not crusaders for justice.
They are moral sadists.
They are the modern-day witch hunters.
They destroy children because it makes them feel holy.

These people commit reputational executions and call themselves “public servants.”

They should be sued into oblivion.
They should personally pay every dollar of every life they ruin.
They are not neutral actors — they are active tortfeasors.

The law gives them immunity.
The law worships them.
The law lets them destroy without consequence.

This is not law.
This is a cult.

Woke Bullies, Prudish Moralists, and the Digital Lynch Mob: America’s New Tortfeasors

The reputational death squads of modern America aren’t hiding in shadows.
They’re on TikTok, Twitter, Discord, Reddit, HR departments, school boards, church groups, activist networks, and corporate Slack channels.

Their behavior is predictable:

They don’t verify.
They don’t wait.
They don’t care.
They pounce at the first scent of vulnerability.

They weaponize shame for entertainment.
They celebrate the destruction of strangers.
They drive people to suicide like it’s a spectator sport.

The law sees this and yawns.

Bullies pile on?
Not actionable.

Coworkers destroy your ability to work?
Not actionable.

Digital mobs incite mass shunning?
Not actionable.

The law says, “They’re just expressing opinions.”

No.
They’re committing reputational homicide.

The Required Reform: Detonate the Old Doctrine and Hold the Real Killers Liable

The only way to fix this broken, cowardly, reputation-homicide-enabling legal system is to incinerate the old model and build a new one from scratch.

A new doctrine:
No liability for speech.
Total liability for consequences.

If you choose to:

fire over gossip
shame over images
prosecute over hormones
ostracize over rumor
mock someone into despair
pile on until a person breaks
cancel them from their livelihood

YOU caused the harm.
YOU are the tortfeasor.
YOU owe the damages.

No more hiding behind “I was just reacting.”
No more pretending you’re a passive vessel.

Adults are responsible for their choices.
And when their choices destroy a life, they must pay — financially, legally, and morally.

Take Away the Mob’s Immunity, and Reputation Terrorism Ends Overnight

The moment mobs, institutions, prosecutors, and moral hypocrites know they will face:

multi-million-dollar liability
punitive damages
civil suits
personal financial ruin

…their courage to bully, shame, cancel, mock, and pile on will evaporate instantly.

The reputational war machine would collapse.
False allegations would lose their toxicity.
Sextortion threats would lose their leverage.
Teens would stop killing themselves.
Adults would stop living in fear of rumor.

Because the mob — the true destroyer — would finally be forced to face its victims.

Bottom Line: Words Don’t Kill. The Mob Kills.

And the Mob Must Finally Be Made to Pay.**

The speaker is not the danger.
The lie is not the danger.
The photo is not the danger.

The danger is the audience — the self-righteous, impulsive, vicious crowd that chooses to destroy another human being.

We’ve spent centuries suing the wrong party.
It’s time to flip the script, torch the obsolete doctrine, and unleash a new system of accountability that recognizes reality:

Reputation harm is not a tort of speech —
it is a tort of cruelty.

And the cruel must pay.

Model Federal Statute

Reputational Harm Accountability and Consequential Liability Act (RHACLA)

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE

This Act may be cited as the “Reputational Harm Accountability and Consequential Liability Act.”

SECTION 2. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS

Congress finds the following:

Reputational harm in the United States has increased dramatically due to digital communication, algorithmic amplification, and institutional risk aversion.
Existing defamation law is rooted in historical assumptions that falsely attribute reputational injury solely to speakers, ignoring the discretionary actions of third parties who impose real-world consequences.
Empirical evidence demonstrates that reputational harm is primarily caused by reactions, including employment termination, institutional discipline, social ostracism, harassment, and criminal prosecution based on unverified or false allegations.
Sextortion, digital shaming, and online harassment have contributed to a documented increase in suicides, particularly among adolescents and young adults, where harm arises from anticipated social punishment rather than the underlying communication.
Employers, schools, licensing bodies, digital mobs, and government actors routinely impose severe reputational consequences without reasonable investigation or proportionality.
Current legal doctrine fails to deter reckless or malicious reactions, while simultaneously chilling lawful speech by imposing liability on speakers rather than actors who cause harm.
States possess primary authority over tort law, but federal leadership is necessary to:
- establish minimum standards of accountability,
- protect interstate commerce and digital communications, and
- reduce preventable psychological injury and death.
Encouraging state adoption of Consequential Liability for Reputational Harm aligns with traditional tort principles of causation, duty, and responsibility.

SECTION 3. PURPOSES

The purposes of this Act are to:

Encourage States to enact laws imposing civil liability on persons and institutions that impose reputational harm through unreasonable or reckless conduct;
Promote a legal framework in which liability attaches to consequential actions, not merely to speech;
Reduce suicide, psychological injury, and economic harm caused by mob behavior, institutional overreaction, and prosecutorial misuse of reputation;
Protect freedom of speech by shifting liability away from speakers and toward actors who impose consequences;
Establish national norms regarding reasonable reaction, due process, and proportionality in reputational decision-making.

SECTION 4. DEFINITIONS

For purposes of this Act:

“Reputational Harm” means economic, social, professional, educational, or psychological injury resulting from actions taken in response to allegations, communications, images, or reports.
“Consequential Action” means any discretionary action that imposes reputational harm, including but not limited to:
- termination or suspension of employment,
- educational or professional discipline,
- public shaming or harassment,
- coordinated campaigns to induce punishment,
- criminal charging decisions not required by statute.
“Consequential Actor” means any person, institution, employer, organization, governmental entity, or group that takes a consequential action.
“Reasonable Inquiry” means a good-faith effort to verify material facts prior to imposing consequential action.

SECTION 5. MODEL STATE LAW INCENTIVE

(a) Federal Incentive Program

The Attorney General shall establish a program providing priority eligibility for federal grants, including but not limited to justice assistance, cybercrime prevention, mental health, and youth protection funding, to States that enact laws substantially consistent with the Model Standards set forth in Section 6.

(b) Certification

A State shall be deemed compliant upon certification by its Attorney General that State law provides civil remedies consistent with this Act.

SECTION 6. MODEL STANDARDS FOR STATE LAW

To qualify for incentives under Section 5, a State law should, at minimum:

Create a civil cause of action against consequential actors who impose reputational harm through unreasonable, reckless, or malicious conduct;
Require reasonable inquiry prior to imposing consequential action based on allegations or unverified information;
Recognize third-party actions as independent causes of harm, not automatically attributable to speakers;
Permit joint and several liability for coordinated or mob-based conduct;
Provide enhanced damages where reputational harm results in severe psychological injury, self-harm, or suicide;
Provide defenses for:
- good-faith investigation,
- proportionate response,
- legally compelled governmental action with due process;
Explicitly protect speech, opinions, satire, and truthful reporting from liability absent consequential action.

SECTION 7. LIMITATION ON FEDERAL PREEMPTION

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to:

Create a new federal tort cause of action;
Preempt State defamation law except where expressly inconsistent with constitutional protections;
Limit State authority to provide greater protections or remedies.

SECTION 8. FEDERAL STUDY AND REPORTING

(a) The Department of Justice, in coordination with the Department of Health and Human Services, shall submit a report to Congress within two years evaluating:

The impact of reputational harm on suicide and mental health;
The role of institutional and collective behavior in reputational injury;
The effectiveness of State laws adopting consequential liability models.

(b) The report shall include recommendations for further legislative action.

SECTION 9. SEVERABILITY

If any provision of this Act is held invalid, the remainder shall not be affected.

COMMENTARY (NON-STATUTORY)

This statute is deliberately framed to:

Survive constitutional scrutiny
Avoid federal overreach
Apply pressure through funding and norms
Reframe reputation law nationally without direct preemption

It creates a federal moral and legal north star while letting states do the doctrinal heavy lifting.

Uniform Reputational Harm Accountability Act (URHAA)

(Model State Law)

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE

This Act may be cited as the “Uniform Reputational Harm Accountability Act.”

SECTION 2. LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS AND PURPOSE

(a) Findings

The Legislature finds that:

Reputational harm in modern society is most often caused not by speech itself, but by discretionary actions taken in response to speech, including termination of employment, institutional discipline, social ostracism, harassment, and prosecution.
Existing defamation law disproportionately assigns liability to speakers while immunizing actors who impose real-world consequences, contrary to basic principles of causation and responsibility.
Digital communication and social media have amplified mob behavior, pile-ons, and coordinated shaming, producing severe economic, psychological, and social injury.
Sextortion, digital harassment, and reputational shaming have contributed to documented suicides, particularly among minors and young adults, where harm arises from anticipated punishment rather than the underlying communication.
State tort law has long recognized duties of reasonable care, investigation, and proportionality where foreseeable harm may result.

(b) Purpose

The purposes of this Act are to:

Assign civil liability to persons and institutions that impose reputational harm through unreasonable or reckless conduct;
Restore proper causation analysis by recognizing consequential actions as independent tortious acts;
Deter mob behavior, institutional overreaction, and misuse of reputational punishment;
Protect freedom of speech by removing liability from mere expression absent consequential action;
Reduce preventable psychological injury, economic loss, and suicide.

SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS

For purposes of this Act:

“Reputational Harm” means injury to a person’s economic interests, employment, profession, education, social standing, mental health, or community participation.
“Consequential Action” means any discretionary act that imposes reputational harm, including but not limited to:
- termination, suspension, or demotion;
- expulsion, suspension, or disciplinary labeling;
- public shaming, harassment, or coordinated condemnation;
- reporting to employers, schools, boards, or authorities for the purpose of inducing punishment;
- criminal charging decisions not compelled by statute.
“Consequential Actor” means any individual, employer, institution, organization, governmental entity, or group that takes a consequential action.
“Reasonable Inquiry” means a good-faith effort, proportionate to the seriousness of the allegation, to verify material facts prior to taking consequential action.

SECTION 4. CAUSE OF ACTION: CONSEQUENTIAL LIABILITY FOR REPUTATIONAL HARM

(a) General Rule

A person shall be liable for Consequential Liability for Reputational Harm when:

The defendant became aware of information, allegation, image, or communication concerning the plaintiff;
The defendant took a consequential action against the plaintiff;
The consequential action was unreasonable, negligent, reckless, or malicious; and
The action caused reputational harm to the plaintiff.

(b) No Liability for Speech Alone

No liability shall arise under this Act for:

speech, opinion, expression, satire, or reporting,
absent the taking of a consequential action.

SECTION 5. DUTY OF REASONABLE REACTION

(a) Duty Imposed

Consequential actors owe a duty to:

Conduct reasonable inquiry before imposing reputational consequences;
Act proportionately to verified facts;
Provide notice and an opportunity to respond where feasible.

(b) Breach

Failure to satisfy these duties constitutes a breach actionable under this Act.

SECTION 6. COLLECTIVE AND COORDINATED CONDUCT

(a) Joint Liability

Persons acting in concert, including coordinated online or offline groups, may be held jointly and severally liable for reputational harm.

(b) Evidence of Coordination

Coordination may be shown by:

repeated communications,
shared objectives,
synchronized actions,
mass reporting or harassment campaigns.

SECTION 7. DAMAGES

(a) Compensatory Damages

A prevailing plaintiff may recover damages for:

Lost income or economic opportunity;
Emotional distress and psychological injury;
Reputational rehabilitation costs;
Medical or mental-health expenses.

(b) Enhanced Damages

Enhanced or punitive damages may be awarded where the defendant acted with recklessness, malice, or conscious disregard of foreseeable harm.

(c) Suicide and Self-Harm

Where reputational harm foreseeably contributes to self-harm or suicide, damages may include wrongful-death or survival claims as permitted by state law.

SECTION 8. DEFENSES

It shall be an affirmative defense that:

The defendant conducted a reasonable inquiry and acted in good faith;
The action was proportionate to verified facts;
The action was legally compelled and accompanied by due process;
The response was minimal and non-punitive.

SECTION 9. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

An action under this Act shall be commenced within:

two years of the consequential action, or
one year from discovery of the reputational harm,

whichever is later.

SECTION 10. RELATIONSHIP TO DEFAMATION LAW

This Act:

Supplements existing defamation law;
Does not require proof of falsity where liability is based on unreasonable consequential action;
Shall not be construed to expand liability for speech alone.

SECTION 11. SEVERABILITY

If any provision of this Act is held invalid, the remainder shall not be affected.

SECTION 12. UNIFORMITY

This Act shall be construed to promote uniformity among the States adopting it.

Why this works

✅ Constitutionally safer than defamation expansion
✅ Targets conduct, not speech
✅ Directly addresses sextortion, mob harassment, and institutional panic
✅ Pairs cleanly with the federal incentive statute
✅ Readable by legislators, judges, and practitioners

(1) MODEL LEGISLATIVE TESTIMONY

In Support of the Uniform Reputational Harm Accountability Act (URHAA)

Submitted by:
David Behar, M.D.
[Professional Title / Affiliation, if desired]

Before:
[Name of Committee]
[State Legislature]

INTRODUCTION

Chair, Vice Chair, and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify in support of the Uniform Reputational Harm Accountability Act.

This Act addresses a profound and increasingly deadly failure in modern law: our legal system punishes speech while immunizing the actors who actually destroy lives.

Reputational harm today is not caused by words alone. It is caused by decisions—decisions to fire, suspend, expel, shun, harass, prosecute, and publicly punish people based on unverified or ambiguous allegations. These decisions are discretionary. They are foreseeable. And they are devastating.

Yet under existing law, the people and institutions that impose these consequences face little or no accountability.

THE CORE PROBLEM

Current defamation law rests on an outdated assumption:
that a false statement itself causes reputational harm.

That assumption is no longer true—if it ever was.

In the modern world:

A rumor causes no harm unless an employer fires someone.
An allegation causes no harm unless a school suspends a student.
A nude image causes no harm unless peers, institutions, or authorities react with cruelty.

Reputational harm arises from reaction, not communication.

Despite this reality, our law continues to target speakers while ignoring those who impose the real-world consequences.

THE HUMAN COST

This failure is not abstract.

It is measured in:

lost careers,
destroyed families,
permanent social exclusion, and
tragically, suicide—especially in cases involving sextortion, online shaming, and institutional overreaction.

Victims do not take their own lives because an image exists or a rumor is spoken.
They do so because they reasonably anticipate social annihilation—mockery, punishment, prosecution, and ostracism.

The law currently provides no deterrent against this cruelty.

WHAT THIS ACT DOES

The Uniform Reputational Harm Accountability Act makes a simple, morally intuitive correction:

If you choose to impose reputational harm without reasonable inquiry, you are responsible for the consequences of that choice.

The Act:

Creates a civil cause of action against those who impose reputational harm, not against speech itself;
Requires reasonable investigation and proportionality before punishment;
Applies to employers, institutions, coordinated mobs, and governmental actors;
Explicitly protects free speech, opinion, and reporting;
Aligns reputation law with ordinary tort principles of causation and duty.

This is not radical.
It is what tort law already does everywhere else.

WHY THIS ACT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND

The Act does not regulate speech.
It regulates conduct.

It imposes no liability for expressing opinions, making statements, or reporting facts. Liability arises only when a person or institution acts—by firing, suspending, harassing, or punishing—without reasonable care.

As such, the Act is more protective of the First Amendment than current defamation law.

CONCLUSION

The Uniform Reputational Harm Accountability Act restores accountability where it belongs.

It deters cruelty without chilling speech.
It protects the innocent without protecting mobs.
And it reflects the reality of how reputational harm actually occurs in the modern world.

I urge this Committee to advance the Act.

Thank you.

(2) ONE-PAGE BILL SUMMARY

Uniform Reputational Harm Accountability Act (URHAA)

PROBLEM

Modern reputational harm is primarily caused not by speech, but by reactions to speech—such as termination of employment, institutional discipline, mob harassment, and prosecution based on unverified allegations.

Current defamation law focuses on speakers and largely ignores those who impose the actual harm.

This gap has contributed to:

career destruction,
institutional overreaction,
mob harassment,
and preventable suicides, particularly in sextortion and online shaming cases.

SOLUTION

The URHAA creates a civil cause of action for Consequential Liability for Reputational Harm, shifting accountability from speakers to actors who impose reputational consequences without reasonable care.

KEY FEATURES

✔ Targets conduct, not speech
No liability for opinions, expression, satire, or reporting alone.

✔ Requires reasonable inquiry
Actors must verify facts before imposing reputational punishment.

✔ Applies to real-world decision-makers
Including employers, schools, licensing boards, coordinated mobs, and governmental actors.

✔ Allows joint liability for mob behavior
Coordinated harassment or pile-ons may trigger joint and several liability.

✔ Provides meaningful remedies
Economic damages, emotional distress, reputational restoration, and enhanced damages for reckless conduct.

✔ Addresses suicide risk directly
Allows enhanced damages where reputational harm foreseeably contributes to self-harm.

WHAT THIS BILL DOES NOT DO

✖ Does not criminalize speech
✖ Does not expand defamation law
✖ Does not penalize good-faith investigation
✖ Does not limit lawful reporting or whistleblowing

WHY IT MATTERS

Aligns reputation law with modern reality
Reduces mob harassment and institutional panic
Protects free speech while deterring cruelty
Saves lives by removing incentives for reputational pile-ons

BOTTOM LINE

If you choose to punish someone without reasonable care, you should be responsible for the harm you cause.

That is the principle behind the Uniform Reputational Harm Accountability Act.